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ABSTRACT 
The field of nanotechnologies has been the subject of a process of wide-ranging regulation, 
which covers two different trends. From the 2000s the European Commission and 
Parliament agreed on a type of adaptive, experimental and flexible approach, which had its 
apex with the Commission code of conduct on responsible nano-research developed 
through a set of consultations. In 2009 this initial agreement subsequently broke down and 
the EU started to develop a set of regulatory initiatives of a sectoral nature in several fields 
(cosmetics, food, biocides). Thus, the current arrangement of governance in the field of 
nanotechnologies appears to be a hybrid, which mixes forms belonging to the new 
governance method (consultations, self-regulation, agency, comitology committees, 
networking), working like a lung in the framework of EU policy, with more traditional tools 
belonging to the classic governance method (regulations, directives). This model of 
governance based on a case-by-case approach runs the risk of lacking coherence since it is 
exposed to sudden changes of direction when risks emerge and it has a weak anticipatory 
dimension due to both its excessive dependency on data collection and its insufficient use of 
upstream criteria, such as human rights, which should be used earlier, to allow anticipated 
intervention with a less intense use of hard law solutions. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
According to the Scientific Committee on Emerging and Newly Identified Health Risks 
(SCENIHR) 'nanomaterials are similar to normal chemicals/substances in that some may be 
toxic and some may not' (SCENIHR, 2009: 56). This means that it is not possible to have a 
general paradigm of risk assessment applicable in the case of nanomaterials (i.e. 
nanomaterials are not generally harmful or good), but we need to distinguish case by 
case [2] . In other words, there is no substantial equivalence with other common materials 
existing in nature, but we cannot generalize as regards nanotechnologies. Since at the 
atomic/molecular level matter displays uncommon properties depending on its size, shape, 
chemical bonds, polarity etc., engineered nanomaterials are all different with different 
physical and ethical implications with regard to risks and benefits. For this reason it is more 
appropriate to talk of nanotechnologies in the plural, instead of simply nanotechnology 
(Ruggiu, 2013a: 203). 
While it is appropriate to talk of a case-by-case approach as regards the risk assessment of 
nanotechnologies, on the governance on nanotechnologies this case-by-case approach is not 
the only possibility. There are various possible approaches to this matter, ranging from the 
precautionary to the proactive, or the new model of Responsible Research and Innovation 
(von Schomberg, 2011; 2013; Owen et al., 2012; Owen et al., 2013; Ruggiu, 2015). Yet the case-
by-case approach seems to be the leitmotiv of the EU regulatory framework on 
nanotechnologies (Widmer et al., 2010; Stoke and Bowman, 2012), able to shift from an initial 
stage characterized by soft law tools to one where hard law tools seem to be the privileged 
form of governance (Kurath et al., 2014). This approach seems to have led to a hybrid 
landscape where new forms of governance [3]coexist with more traditional tools, which 
appear to be the final stage of this process of evolution. From the standpoint of governance 
theories, it represents a case of coexistence of the new governance method and the classic 
Community Method with a slightly increased preference for the second style. In this context, 
new tools of governance, characterized by informality and a-typicality, are aimed at 
involving stakeholders through a more accurate distribution of responsibilities. By thus 
enlarging participation, they work like a bellows in the framework of EU policy with a view 
to consolidating EU regulation. Yet they seem to be merely provisional in favour of the more 
stable sectoral legislation. Besides, this approach with its unforeseen shifts reveals a lack of 
coherence since it largely depends on the incremental process of knowledge, and it is 
exposed to sudden changes of mood of public institutions. Finally, it shows weak 
anticipatory structures since its evolution broadly depends on sudden events that can cause 
the gradual stiffening of governance tools, by privileging those of a sectoral nature (hard 
law). This means that in future nanotechnologies will be regulated according to forms of 
more traditional regulation, but the cost (in terms of rules, policy change, the restraint of 
innovative processes, and even economic factors) of these abrupt unforeseen shifts has not 
been considered. 
In this paper I will follow the growth and the development of the European Union strategy 
on nanotechnologies from its premises (the safe, integrated and responsible approach) in the 
2000s to its subsequent consolidation in forms of hard legislation today. In particular I will 
describe the initial agreement between the Commission and the European Parliament with 
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the development of an adaptive, experimental and flexible model of governance, which had 
its climax with the Commission code of conduct on nanotechnologies, and the subsequent 
and abrupt direction change with the progressive adoption of a series of sectorial EU 
initiatives of a hard law nature in the field of cosmetics, nanofood and feed, and biocides. I 
will argue that the current model of governance is a hybrid, which structurally mixes forms 
belonging to the new governance paradigm (consultations, self-regulation, agency, 
networking) with more traditional tools (mainly directives, regulations) in order to 
progressively reach a sectoral regulation of the rising sector of nanotechnologies. This model 
is characterized by the decreasing use of new governance tools, working like a bellows 
within the framework of the EU policy, in favour of the traditional governance method. 
Finally, I will argue that this model of governance based on a case-by-case approach runs 
the risk of incoherence since it is exposed to sudden changes of direction following the 
increase of knowledge and has a weak proactive dimension due to its excessive dependency 
on data collection and its insufficient use of upstream criteria, such as human rights, which 
would allow anticipated intervention with a less massive use of hard law solutions. 
First of all, I will describe the rise of the safe, integrated and responsible approach launched 
by the European Commission in 2000. Then, I will analyse the Commission code of conduct 
on nanotechnologies, developed through a set of consultation processes, which represent a 
significant innovation in the field of the governance of emerging technologies. I will then 
follow the change of direction given by the 2009 Parliament resolution with which the 
European Parliament broke its initial agreement with the Commission on the initiatives to be 
contained in the EU policy on nanotechnologies. In this instance I will describe the 
progressive adoption of regulatory initiatives in several fields (cosmetics, food, biocides) of a 
traditional nature up until the start of the revision process of REACH. Finally, I will give an 
overview of the current arrangement of governance at the EU level as a mix of new 
governance and classic governance methods and assessing its strengths and its limits. 
2. REGULATING UNCERTAIN FIELDS 
The impossibility of encompassing all nanotechnologies under the same definitive (positive 
or negative) judgment prevents the regulator from adopting simplistic solutions of a 
trenchant nature, such as a general ban or a general green light. Rulemaking in this field has 
become difficult due to the uncertainty which characterizes each emerging technology. In 
this field, besides scientific uncertainty there is also a state of unavoidable regulatory 
uncertainty. The uncommon features of nanotechnologies leave some open questions, 
representing a limit for the regulator. 
In general terms, there is a lack of data regarding the implied risks of nanomaterials (and the 
way to overcome them). There is no shared definition of nanomaterial; and there is great 
uncertainty with regard to terminology, classification and metrology (there is the need for 
common standards with which to measure them) (Marchant, Sylvester and Abbott, 2008; 
Kearnes and Rip, 2009; von Schomberg, 2011). Moreover, although nanotechnologies do not 
act in a regulatory vacuum (as some have noted, the existing regulations apply in this sector 
[van Calster, 2006]), given their novelty, there is uncertainty with regard to both their 
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adequacy and efficacy. There is also the need for further legal, ethical, and sociological 
studies on their implications (Mandel, 2009; Rip, 2002). 
Without wishing to generalize or scaremonger, it is true that, along with their undoubted 
advantages, nanotechnologies imply a number of risks we need to consider. Indeed studies 
have revealed the existence of a criticality regarding the toxicology and the ecotoxicology of 
some engineered nanomaterials. For example, there are studies addressing the allegation 
that carbon nanotubes (both single and multi-walled) can cause lung inflammations 
(Shvedova et al., 2005), as well as granulomas once insert into abdomen of mice (Poland et 
al., 2008) [4] ; other studies address dangers to health and the environment with regard to 
silver nanospheres (Mwilu et al., 2013; SCENIHR, 2014), titanium dioxide nanoparticles 
included in several sun creams (Zhang et al., 2007), or the use of nickel nanoparticles in the 
working environment which could cause allergic reactions in a setting without any specific 
respiratory protection or control measures (Journeay and Goldman, 2014). 
Nanotechnologies are not only promising future technologies: they are also a reality already 
present in our lives. Despite the multitude of current studies on nanotechnologies which 
promise to revolutionize medicine (e.g. cancer treatments), electronics (micro and nano-
chips, ultra-powerful processors), environmental pollution (water purification systems, 
nanoremediation of oil spill), and energy generation and storage (fuel cells, batteries, 
photovoltaic cells), nanotechnologies are already widely commercialized in cosmetics, 
electronics, the automotive industry, the fields of food and agriculture (ingredients, food 
storage systems, feed), paints, and biocidal products (such as pesticides, insect repellents, 
disinfectants etc. - Throne-Host and Strandbakken 2009). [5] If there is any risk regarding 
commercialized nanomaterials, it is true that, to some degree, it could already be present 
(Ruggiu, 2013a). In this regard it is quite difficult to bring under identical regulation the 
whole range of the nanotechnologies world, which is made up of research and markets with 
very different needs. 
This complex framework makes the task of regulating even more difficult since the legislator 
would have to create a toolkit able to give different responses (to present and future needs) 
and do different things (Ruggiu, 2013a). 
3. THE EU STRATEGY IN THE FIELD OF 
NANOTECHNOLOGIES 
Taking into account the lesson learnt from the case of biotechnology (Metha, 2004; von 
Schomberg, 2013), in the 2000s the EU strategy in the field of nanotechnologies was 
characterised by caution. At that time, although they had been discovered roughly fifteen 
years previously, nanotechnologies were at their infancy [6] . Uncertainty was so 
widespread at all levels (scientific, ethical, regulatory) so as to discourage any attempt at 
regulating this field by resorting to classic hard legislation measures (Mandel, 2009; Pariotti 
and Ruggiu, 2012). Besides, there was the widespread belief that, given the increasing 
influence of private actors within global governance, it was increasingly difficult to ensure 
the success of any governance tool without the cooperative action of stakeholders (Kooiman 
and Van Vliet, 1993; Kearnes and Rip, 2009; Pariotti and Ruggiu, 2012: 112). In this context, 
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in fact, there was a need for tools devised for strongly motivating actors beyond mere 
compliance with legal provisions. Thus there was the need for tools other than those of hard 
legislation. 
The action of the European Union started from this recognition. The strategy adopted by the 
Commission was initially to wait and see: i) whether there were risks and what they were; ii) 
whether the existing regulation was adequate for this rising field; iii) whether and how the 
principal actors were developing spontaneous forms of self-regulation. The EU authorities 
would then have adopted the necessary measures. In this context we can frame a number of 
tools such as communications, resolutions, recommendations that were aimed at 
increasingly giving responsibilities to stakeholders (Dorbeck-Jung and Shelley-Egan, 2013). 
On the basis of this mix of wait and see and case-by-case logic (Widmer et al., 2010; Stoke and 
Bowman, 2012), the European Commission initially was in agreement with the European 
Parliament. Yet, as we will see later, this initial agreement did not last indefinitely. 
Behind this strategy there was the hope of fostering a general climate of responsibility and 
cooperation among stakeholders, most of all for entrepreneurialism and industrial 
innovation. At the core there was the belief that the market would be able to quickly develop 
and, if possible, self-regulate, at least until the moment when scientific data would be 
complete or sufficiently robust for developing a more stringent regulatory framework in this 
promising field. It was an adaptive, flexible and (slightly) inclusive approach of an 
experimentalist nature that would have had to accompany the growth of the entire sector 
until it reached its maturity (Roco, 2006; Kearnes and Rip, 2009; Widmer et al., 2010; Mandel, 
2013). 
This route starts with the 2004 Commission communication Towards a European Strategy 
for Nanotechnology where the Community authorities laid the basis of the safe, integrated 
and responsible approach [7] (European Commission, 2004). The Commission communication 
adopted an integrated strategy able to build a bridge between the public and the private 
sector. 'This require[d] efforts by the public as well as the private sector', and the prompt 
consideration of '[a]ny negative impacts on public health, safety or the environment […] as 
an integral part of the technological development process' (European Commission, 2004: 1). 
This approach was thus aimed at fostering a process of responsibilisation by enlarging the 
involvement of all parties in order to create the premises of a general self-regulatory attitude 
(Dorbeck-Jung and Shelley-Egan, 2013; Ruggiu, 2014). 
With the subsequent 2005 communication, the Commission elaborated 'a series of 
articulated and integrated actions for the immediate implementation of a safe, integrated 
and responsible strategy for' nanotechnologies (European Commission, 2005: 3). In 
particular, it proposed: doubling the FP7 budget compared to FP6 especially in the 
nanoelectronics sector; boosting toxicological and ecotoxicological studies on the impact of 
nanoparticles on health and the environment; ensuring that EU funded projects in 
nanotechnologies are subjected to ethical review so as to respect 'fundamental ethical 
principles' in order to help build confidence in decision-making; developing simultaneously 
ethical, legal, and sociological studies in this matter (ELSI studies) in order to anticipate their 
impact at an earlier stage; asking the EGE to carry out an ethical analysis of nanomedicine; 
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promoting measures to minimise the exposure of workers, consumers and the environment; 
supporting existing infrastructures and transnational networks among universities, research 
organizations and industry in order to assemble critical mass through distributed poles of 
excellence; fostering the exchange of best practices in industry and the increase of industry 
involvement in EU R&D projects on nanotechnologies; establishing a monitoring system of 
patents in this sector; coordinating and strengthening actions in the standardization process 
and the development with member States, international organizations, European agencies, 
and the industry of terminology, guidelines, models, and standards for risk assessment 
throughout the whole lifecycle of nanoproducts; boosting an inclusive, aware, public 
dialogue on the impacts of nanotechnologies; using the pattern of the Open Method of 
Coordination (i.e. new governance) as the best way for the exchange of information; 
increasing dialogue at international level, especially with industry, to create a code of 
conduct on the use and development of nanotechnologies; and reviewing and, where 
appropriate, proposing adaptations of the existing regulation at the both the EU and the 
national level. 
In sum, the main directions of the safe, integrated and responsible approach were i) to boost 
networking infrastructures for research and development of the sector, ii) to develop a better 
integration between research and its ethical dimension, iii) to involve all stakeholders in the 
development of nanotechnologies and their regulation, and in the meantime iv) to apply the 
current regulatory framework by checking its adequacy. 
With the 2006 Parliament resolution, the approach proposed by the Commission was 
substantially accepted (European Parliament, 2006). In particular, according to the European 
Parliament, a responsible strategy on nanotechnologies required integrating knowledge on 
social, health and safety aspects with technological development. For this reason it was 
better to engage the Commission, member States and industry in an effective dialogue with 
all stakeholders in order to steer nanotechnology developments along a sustainable path. In 
this inclusive approach, industry needed to take into account risks posed to human health, 
to consumers, workers, and the environment during the whole lifecycle of nanoproducts, 
and contribute to the dissemination of information concerning their use and risks. 
In the same year the European Union launched the Seventh Framework Programme (FP7), 
which identified nanotechnologies as one of the key areas to be widely encouraged in order 
to build a 'strong industrial base' in Europe and improve industry competitiveness 
(European Union, 2006: 17). FP6 invested around €1,36 billion in nanotechnologies, while 
FP7 dedicated €3,5 billion to this research field (EGE, 2007: 7). For this purpose, the FP7 built 
a broad ethics framework in which to develop European research and innovation. Thus, for 
key enabling technologies, such as nanotechnologies, it tried to foster greater integration 
between disciplines and different areas by 'broadening the engagement of researchers and 
the public at large […] with scientific related questions, to anticipate and clarify political and 
societal issues, including ethical issues' (European Union, 2006: 34). In this regard any 
supported research was required to respect the 'fundamental ethical principles including 
those reflected in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union', as well as the 
EGE's opinions and the Protocol on the protection and welfare of animals (European Union, 
2006: 41). In conformity with the direction initially adopted by the European Union, the 
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anticipatory dimension of the EU policy rested mainly on a process of wide social inclusion 
in order to build the premises for a general dialogue regarding the social and ethical aspects 
of technological development. 
Accordingly, in 2007, the EGE delivered its opinion on nanomedicine (EGE, 2007). In this it 
underlined 'the need to establish measures to verify the safety of nanomedical products' at 
both the national and the EU level (EGE, 2007: 5). It expressed the need to launch wide 
public participation concerning uncertainties and the knowledge gap, and it addressed the 
opportunity of fostering interdisciplinary research in this field by also including ethical, 
legal and sociological studies according to the pattern developed by the Commission in 
2000s. In this regard it assessed the existing regulatory structures as adequate, but suggested 
the Commission should consider make changes within this framework, and addressed the 
risk of overlapping between different regulations (EGE, 2007: 6). 
4. THE EXPERIENCE OF THE COMMISSION CODE 
OF CONDUCT 
The high point of this approach should have been a code of conduct on nanotechnologies 
(Ruggiu, 2014). In this framework the Commission code of conduct and the first consultation 
promoted by the EU in 2007 appear to be coherent with the 2004 communication of the 
Commission (European Commission, 2004) which outlined the basis of a safe, integrated 
and responsible approach, and with the Nanotechnologies Action Plan 2005/2009 (European 
Commission, 2005) which proposed the adoption of a code of conduct (European 
Commission, 2007a: 2). Yet, instead of dealing with the entire innovation cycle (research, 
production, commercialization, recycling), the 2008 Commission code of conduct only dealt 
with research. The reason for this choice will become clearer later. It represents the final 
stage of the process of stakeholder engagement triggered by the 2004 Commission 
communication, the maximum effort of the European Union in involving a key group of 
stakeholders engaged in nanotechnologies: researchers. Yet the outcome of this ambitious 
initiative was only partially successful. 
The Commission code of conduct for responsible nanosciences and nanotechnologies 
research [8] (EC CoC) is the result of an experiment in governance, which adopts the new 
governance method in the field of emerging technologies for the first time, since it was 
reached through a consultation process launched by the Commission in 2007 (Ruggiu, 2014). 
It can be also deemed as the first case of the application of Responsible Research and 
Innovation (von Schomberg, 2011; 2013; Owen et al., 2012; Owen et al., 2013; Ruggiu, 2015) 
within the EU. 
In a landscape where risks are scattered (Beck, 1986) and the relevant actors are distributed 
over the global sphere (Stoke 1998: 21; Pariotti and Ruggiu, 2012: 112), responsibility also 
needs to be distributed (von Schomberg 2010: 56), especially in the face of the current 
process of erosion of the State capacity for global regulation (Grande, 2001). In this regard, 
experiences of self-regulation, such as codes of conduct, are clearly part of 'responsibilisation 
phenomena', since they aim at distributing the responsibility among stakeholders (Parker, 
2007; Dorbeck-Jung and Shelley-Egan, 2013; Ruggiu, 2014). In this perspective, self-
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regulatory tools, such as codes, are a form of meta-regulation (Coglianese and Mendelson 
2010), meaning 'a process of regulating the regulators, whether they are public agencies, 
private corporate self-regulators or third party gatekeepers' (Dorbeck-Jung and Shelley-
Egan, 2013: 56). In other words, meta-regulatory tools enact norms regulating the process of 
regulation, namely, in the case of the code of conduct, self-regulation (Parker 2007: 211). Any 
tool aimed at steering the law-making process (regulation, self-regulation such as codes of 
conduct), either public (statute law) or private (societal dialogue, networking, consultations), 
belongs to the dimension of meta-regulation. In this sense, consultation processes aimed at 
drafting the EC CoC can represent an effective example of a meta-regulatory tool (Ruggiu, 
2014). 
Between 2007 and 2010 the Commission launched two consultations: one in 2007 aimed at 
drafting a code of conduct on nanotechnologies (European Commission, 2007b) and one 
between 2009 and 2010 aimed at detecting stakeholders' opinions on this self-regulatory 
experience (European Commission, 2010). The consultation processes launched both directly 
by the European Commission (through its Directorate-General for Research) and, indirectly, 
outside it (e.g. the NanoCode project through the FP7 [9] ) represent an attempt at governing 
the emerging field of nanotechnologies by triggering spontaneous pathways of co-
responsibility among stakeholders. In this sense, the Commission code of conduct should be 
interpreted within the larger framework of the new governance method in the field of 
emerging technologies (Ruggiu, 2014; 2015). 
The first 2007 consultation was launched on the basis of a document, called a 'consultation 
paper', that was meant to represent the starting point in the process of drafting the code 
(European Commission 2007a). In this drafting process stakeholders should have been 
actively involved. The consultation paper was thus the trigger for the process of the code 
formulation, as it was the basis of the subsequent 2007 consultation that led to the formation 
of the code principles by selected groups of stakeholders. The aim of the consultation paper 
was to indicate EU goals (the 'normative anchor points' according to the Responsible 
Research and Innovation terminology (von Schomberg, 2013)) that should have driven the 
whole process of code setting: techno-scientific advance, market competitiveness, the 
protection of human health and the environment, EU fundamental rights (Ruggiu, 2014; 
2015). Among these goals the code of conduct should have struck a fair balance. 
In this document the Commission outlined reference points for future consultation '[i]n 
order to promote safe and responsible nanotechnology research and pave the wave to its 
safe and responsible application and use' (European Commission 2007a: 1). The Commission 
explained the reason for limiting the scope of the code on research: '[o]n the one hand it 
develops new technologies for application in industry […] on the other hand it investigates 
the potential risks and establishes the appropriate measures to take' (European Commission 
2007a: 1). In other words, research had an across-the-board nature, by being at the basis of 
both industrial advance and university inquiry. Yet, the outcome of this restriction of the 
scope of the code was to involve in the process of responsibilisation only researchers. 
The choice of restricting the scope of the code probably reflects a more concrete and realistic 
approach, avoiding excessively ambitious attempts that could have led to foreseeable failure 
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(for example, by providing a code for all emerging technologies or a code for overall 
research and innovation). Yet it came at a (remediable) cost: the perception of an unfair 
distribution of responsibilities (Ruggiu, 2014: 7). As noted on emerging technologies, the 
development of nanotechnologies depends on the involvement of many actors: public 
authorities (EU and member States), enterprises and industry, research organizations (both 
public and private), funding organizations (both public, e.g. the EU and States etc., and 
private, e.g. banks, foundations), civil society organizations (trade unions, consumers', 
patients', environmental organizations, animal rights organizations), and the public at large 
(Ferrarese 2010: 40 ff.). In this sense, researchers represent only a small part of the entire 
audience of stakeholders in the field of nanotechnologies. 
It must be noticed, too, that the attention to fundamental rights has varied throughout the 
different stages of the whole process of code drafting. In the consultation paper, the role of 
fundamental rights and the precautionary approach emerge at the core of the Commission 
action since 'confidence in its safety' and 'public acceptance are preconditions for the 
application and commercialization of nanotechnology-based products' (European 
Commission 2007a: 1). This centrality of fundamental rights was progressively weakened in 
the 2008 recommendation on a code of conduct where fundamental rights are not included 
in the set of principles of the CoC and are merely mentioned in some provisions of code 
guidelines. 
As a metaregulatory tool, consultations were successful. The relevance of the consultation 
process within the framework of this initiative was indeed very encouraging. While there 
were three proposed principles of the consultation paper ('precaution', 'inclusiveness' and 
'integrity'), this number rose to seven in the final version ('meaning', 'sustainability', 
'precaution', 'inclusiveness', 'excellence', 'innovation', 'accountability') thanks to suggestions 
arising from the consultation participants (European Commission, 2007a: 3; European 
Commission, 2008a; Ruggiu, 2014: 8). Moreover, some suggestions regarding the limitation 
of those applications aimed at enhancing human performance, nanofood and feed were also 
embraced, meaning that the 2007 consultation reached its goals (Ruggiu, 2014). 
At the beginning of 2008, the code of conduct was adopted with a recommendation 
(European Commission, 2008a). The nature of the code was mainly practical. While we can 
distinguish between a code of conduct and a code of ethics (Arrigo, 2006), we have to 
conclude that the EC CoC belongs to the first type. In fact, by the first type, we mean a ruled-
based tool, that is, a set of rules aimed at driving the conduct of recipients in order to solve 
the various problems in an enterprise's existence (such as harassment in the workplace, 
mobbing, safety etc.). The latter, instead, is value-based, namely a set of principles (such as the 
protection of the environment, health, non-discrimination), without specifying how these 
values should be concretized (Arrigo, 2006: 93). In this regard, although it was made up of a 
set of principles and a set of guidelines, the Commission code of conduct had a clear 
practical aim. 
The responsible action in nanotechnologies research rests here on a set of principles, 
identified by stakeholders through the consultation process, which should clarify the goals 
of the code of conduct rules (i.e. the guidelines), what they aim to do. First of all, research 
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has to pursue the aim of being comprehensible to the lay public (meaning). Research needs to 
be safe and ethical and contribute to the sustainable development of the EU, by avoiding 
representing either a danger for human health and the environment or 'a biological, physical 
or moral threat' (European Commission 2008a: 6 - italics mine) (sustainability). It must respect 
the precautionary principle, that is, while there are risks, it must anticipate the impact at an 
earlier stage by adopting the necessary measures related to the level of protection and the 
benefits of scientific research (precaution). Research needs to ensure openness to all parties, 
transparency and information exchange (inclusiveness). It must pursue the highest scientific 
standards by avoiding data falsification, plagiarism, self-plagiarism (excellence). It needs to 
grant the maximal creativity (innovation ). Researchers and research institutions need to be 
accountable as regard implications to health and the environment in the face of future 
generations ( accountability). Yet this last principle was contested during subsequent surveys 
(Ruggiu, 2014). While all the principles were generally well-accepted, the principle 
of accountability was criticized with regard to the wide reference to future generations. For 
example, during the NanoCode survey, problems regarding the translation of the 
word accountability became apparent. In fact 'the French and the German translations of the 
"accountability" principle as "responsibility" earned mistrust as they were interpreted 
as implying legal liabilities as well as connoting that scientists could be held responsible for 
what is done with their work by decisions outside their control or by other actors in the 
future' (Meili et al., 2011: 6 - italics mine) [10] . In this sense the restriction of the scope 
clearly affected the process of sharing code principles (Ruggiu, 2014). 
Since, as stated above, it is not a mere container of values (that is, it is not value-based), the 
code is also accompanied by a set of guidelines that should steer the organization in all its 
existence by explaining what to do and what not to do and who is responsible for the 
compliance with code provisions. Unfortunately, there is a lack of correlation between the 
principles and the guidelines that weakens the dimension of their practicability. In this 
regard the authors of the NanoCode survey complained that not every principle is reflected 
in all the guidelines (Meili et al., 2011: 26). As attested by the NanoCode survey, there is 'an 
unambiguous demand for increasing its specificity and practicability' (Meili et al., 2011: 23). 
Furthermore, some guidelines are not well formulated and seem to lead to unintended 
consequences or not to the intended ones. For example, guideline 4.1.17 [11] was criticized 
since it risks de facto leading to 'a moratorium on certain types of research in nanomedicine 
and nano-enabled personal care' (Meili et al., 2011: 28). It was also criticized for the absence 
of 'criteria and indicators to clarify how to apply it' (Meili et al., 2011: 28). Moreover 
guideline 4.2.6 [12] was also criticized since 'it seems unrealistic to require all N&N 
researchers to "launch and coordinate" nanotoxicology research' (Meili et al., 2011: 29). In 
this sense the process of communication of the code cannot be deemed to be effective 
(Ruggiu, 2014). 
These difficulties concerning mainly the wording of the code are also reflected in other parts 
of the code. In particular, the language of the Commission limited the comprehensibility of 
the code especially in the preamble and the text of the 2008 recommendation, namely the 
document containing the code itself (Meili et al., 2011: 10). This result was amplified by the 
fact that the recommendation containing the code was made up of several parts while the 
code was only one part of it, though the most important, but the entire recommendation was 
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submitted to stakeholders, not the code alone. In particular, the 2008 recommendation is 
made up of a preamble where the Commission illustrates how the code has been framed 
within EU goals (i.e. 'normative anchor points'), followed by a part where the Commission 
recommends a set of actions mainly to member States, and finally the annex constituted by 
the code itself (in turn, made up of principles and guidelines). In this sense the annex was 
the only part regarding stakeholders. It is clear that concerns over the language of the 
Commission involve those parts of the 2008 recommendation, such as the preamble, where 
the Commission refers bureaucratically to EU goals that evidently were perceived as being 
far from its core, namely the code (Ruggiu, 2014: 9). Yet, with regard to the code, the 
Commission code of conduct seems to lack the typical code structure. 'There is no 
introduction, outlining who should be addressed and what the benefits of using the EU-CoC 
are' (Meili et al., 2011: 10). Thus, it seems that the forma codicis, the mere code writing itself, 
can be deemed an element which can influence the acceptance and the dissemination of this 
instrument [13] . In other words, the process of stakeholders' responsibilisation (i.e. the 
adoption of the code) is also influenced by how values at the core of a meta-regulatory 
instrument (i.e. the code) are proposed to stakeholders (Parker, 2007: 215; Ruggiu, 2014). It is 
not a coincidence that subsequent surveys reveled difficulties in the compliance process. In 
fact, from the NanoCode survey it emerges that up until 2011 only The Netherlands had 
provided a set of measures implementing the Commission code of conduct (Mantovani et 
al., 2010). This data seems to be consistent with the fact that at that time only 21% of 
NanoCode participants (more than 400 people) had adopted the Commission code of 
conduct (Grobe et al., 2011) [14] . The process of responsibilisation triggered by the 2004 
Commission communication finally led to a disappointing result, surely not in line with 
initial expectations. 
This unexpected outcome can be ascribed to a set of causes. i) The engagement of the EU 
and member States appeared to be low, as the interviewees' report stated by referring, for 
example, that at that time there was no official platform providing information about the 
code and helping stakeholders to comply with code principles and guidelines (Meili et al., 
2011a: 7). Furthermore the code could have been accompanied by a system of incentives and 
disincentives (such as a white list, a black list, funding distribution linked to the compliance 
with the code, a set of practical criteria for monitoring, assessing, and verifying the 
compliance degree etc. (Dorbeck-Jung and Shelley-Egan, 2013; Ruggiu, 2014). ii) Moreover, 
there were difficulties with the process of the distribution of responsibility. Since the scope 
of the Commission code of conduct was limited to research, the weight of responsibility 
seemed to lay on the shoulders of research alone. This outcome seems to be confirmed by 
the detected concerns about the accountability principle that mainly involved the 
researchers' group (Meili et al., 2011: 6). This limit could be overcome, as subsequently 
observed in 2009 resolution (European Parliament, 2009), by replicating the experience of the 
code of conduct on nanotechnologies research in the other sector of the innovation chain, 
namely production, commercialization and recycling (von Schomberg, 2011: 55; Ruggiu, 
2014: 10). In this regard the process triggered by the EC CoC should be deemed as partial. 
iii) Finally, what emerges from official and non-official surveys is a weak communication 
dimension in its broad sense, which would need to be strengthened by amending the 
accountability principle and realizing a press release of the code outside the framework of 
the 2008 recommendation (Ruggiu, 2014: 10). There are reasons to argue, in fact, that the 
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perception of the code among its addressees could have been weakened by its inclusion in 
the body of the Commission recommendation, generating a state of confusion for recipients 
(Ruggiu, 2014: 9-10). 
5. THE TURNING POINT IN EU REGULATION ON 
NANOTECHNOLOGIES 
From 2009, EU governance on nanotechnologies characterized by the case-by-case approach 
suddenly started shifting (Ruggiu, 2013a). After the only partially positive experience of the 
EC CoC, the initial agreement between the Commission and the European Parliament broke 
down and the Parliament started taking a position notably different from that of the 
Commission. 
While in 2008 the Commission in its first review of the regulatory aspects of nanomaterials 
still stated that 'that current legislation covers to a large extent risks in relation to 
nanomaterials and that risks can be dealt with under the current legislative framework' 
(European Commission, 2008b: 3), the development of nanotechnologies seemed to reveal a 
different image. 
Immediately after the discovery of the first case of the death of two female workers in a 
paint factory in China, which was reported in 2008, presumably due to exposure to 
nanoparticles (Song et al., 2008), Parliament adopted a critical resolution with which it asked 
the Commission for a strategy change in EU policy (European Parliament, 2009). In this act 
the Parliament noted that while there are multiple expected benefits, nanomaterials still 
'present significant new risks due to their minute size' (European Parliament, 2009: point D), 
and there is 'a significant lack of knowledge and information' concerning definition, size, 
properties and 'the actual use of nanomaterials in consumer products' (European 
Parliament, 2009: points F and H), meaning that 'current funding for research into 
environmental, health and safety aspects' is 'far too low' (European Parliament, 2009: point 
M). In this regard, it was noted that 'SCENIHR [15] identified some specific health hazards 
as well as toxic effects for environmental organisms for some nanomaterials' (European 
Parliament, 2009: point L). For these reasons it called for the adoption of specific regulation 
that applies the precautionary principle, the principle of producer responsibility and the 
'polluter-pays' principle 'to ensure the safe production, use and disposal of nanomaterials 
before the technology is put on the market' (European Parliament, 2009: point Q). In 
addition, it asked for the legislation on chemicals (REACH) (European Union, 2006), the 
main regulatory sector involved in the development of nanotechnologies, which 'reveals 
several further deficiencies to deal with nanomaterials', to be reviewed (European 
Parliament, 2009: point S), as well as the Community legislation on food, workers' 
conditions, air quality and waste, which also needed to address nanotechnologies as well 
(European Parliament, 2009: point V). Furthermore, it highlighted the need for a new EGE 
opinion on the convergence of nanotechnology with biotechnology, biology, cognitive 
sciences and information technology, thus assessing as insufficient the scope of its previous 
2007 opinion on nanomedicine (European Parliament, 2009: point Y), and it called for the 
adoption of a code of conduct by 'all producers intending to manufacture or place goods on 
the market' (European Parliament, 2009: point Z). According to Parliament's view, the entire 
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innovation cycle (production, commercialization and recycling) should have been involved 
in a process of further responsibilisation, by resorting, again, to the tools of self-regulation. 
The consequence of this act of Parliament was an immediate and significant change of 
direction in EU policy on nanotechnologies and the adoption of a set of legislative initiatives 
of a hard law nature in this field (Ruggiu, 2013a). First of all, regulation on cosmetic 
products containing several provisions specifically referring to nanomaterials (European 
Union, 2009) was adopted (Bowman, van Calster and Friedrichs, 2010). According to this 
new EU act, anyone who wants to place a new cosmetic product containing nanomaterials 
on the market has to provide the Commission with safety information six months earlier 
(art. 16.3). Moreover, safety information needs to be notified to the European Commission 
for those products containing nanomaterials, which are already on the market. Furthermore, 
the regulation stipulates specific mandatory labelling [16] , according to which the names of 
the ingredients present in the form of nanomaterials must be followed by the word 'nano' in 
brackets (art. 19.1(g)). Finally, the European Commission was asked to create a publicly 
available 'catalogue of all nanomaterials used in cosmetic products placed on the market … 
and the reasonably foreseeable exposure conditions' (art. 16.10 (a)). 
On this basis, Cosmetics Europe, an industry trade association, including more than 4000 
cosmetics companies and national associations in this sector, laid down a set of guidelines 
integrating the EU regulation on cosmetic products. In particular, the 2011 Colipa guidelines 
on cosmetic products have integrated information requested in labelling when 
nanomaterials are present in cosmetics, helping in this way enterprises in complying with 
Community provisions (Cosmetics Europe, 2011). Moreover, the 2012 guidelines have 
provided further indications for identifying a subject responsible for the actuation of 
labelling commitments, thus strengthening companies' process of compliance with the EU 
regulation (Cosmetics Europe, 2012). Given the overlapping between the action of EU 
authorities and private actors, this fact brought about an interesting integration of self-
governance patterns (Sørensen and Triantafillou, 2009) within EU governance arrangements. 
These two self-regulatory tools have greatly contributed to fostering the process of 
stakeholder compliance with EU provisions and distributing a consistent part of the 
responsibility to the private sector, thus creating positive integration with the EU action of 
governance. 
Accordingly, in 2011 the EU introduced a first provision regarding nanomaterials in 
electronic equipment (European Union, 2011) requiring, with a rather questionable wording, 
as soon as the data was sufficient, the substitution of nanomaterials 'by more environmental 
friendly alternatives' and the modification of the list of restricted substances (art. 16). It also 
launched a consultation involving all stakeholders on the impact on small and medium-
sized enterprises. Yet this sudden change in a key sector of the European economy ran the 
risk of stopping the development of nanoelectronics in Europe, a sector where the probable 
benefits of nanotechnologies are enormous both in terms of economic competitiveness and 
technological advance, without gaining any specific advantage in terms of health and safety 
in the workplace or waste recycling (since electronic articles would have come into Europe 
from abroad in any case). In this regard the EU action showed alarming oscillations, by 
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shifting from initially favouring a deregulated framework to an over-specified framework 
based on irrational bans. 
In the same year, the Commission faced the unsolved terminological question regarding 
nanomaterials and it issued the first definition of nanomaterials in EU legislation to be used 
by member States, EU agencies and companies (European Commission, 2011). According to 
the definition, '"nanomaterial" means a natural or manufactured material containing 
particles, in an unbound state or as an aggregate or as an agglomerate and where, for 50% 
[…] one or more external dimensions is in the size range' between 1 nm and 100 nm. Yet 
some nanomaterials can reach higher or lower thresholds and this makes the use of this 
definition problematic. Wisely this definition has a certain degree of flexibility since there is 
the possibility of assessing in a case-by-case fashion the inclusion of other materials which 
do not conform to these criteria. In fact, the threshold of 50% may be replaced by a lower one 
for concerns involving the environment, health, safety or competitiveness. The definition set 
out by the recommendation should be applied, in particular, in the case of legislation on 
chemicals (REACH) and in the regulation on the classification, labelling and packaging 
(CLP) of hazardous substances and mixtures (European Union, 2008). With regard to the EU 
legislation on consumer products, the Commission was committed to implementing its 
definition of nanomaterial. 
Subsequently, the European Union adopted a new regulation on food labelling explicitly 
considering nanomaterials (European Union, 2011). The food sector is a field where 
nanotechnologies represent a significant factor in development, especially in mass 
production and large consumption goods (e.g. junk food) but where information is 
insufficient (Marrani, 2013). Yet, this regulation does not deal with the entire food sector, but 
only food labelling. In this regard, more attention to this delicate matter directly involving 
consumers' health and safety could probably have been paid, since 'risk, associated with 
nanoparticles, is determined by exposure' (Kuhlbash, 2011: 1). As in the cosmetics sector, the 
regulation contains a provision stipulating specific mandatory labelling, according to which 
the names of the ingredients present in the form of nanomaterials must be followed by the 
word 'nano' in brackets. Yet this provision, fundamental in preserving consumers' freedom 
of choice, as well as that of information, entered into force only in December 2014, after a 
(relatively long) period when enterprises had the necessary time to achieve the conditions 
for complying with it (and, consequently, consumers were not informed) (art. 18.3). 
It is also worth noting that the Commission started to collect data in this sector. Indeed, at 
the request of the Commission, the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) adopted a 
guidance document clarifying the data to be provided when submitting an application 
dossier for nanomaterials to be incorporated in food and feed (EFSA Scientific Committee, 
2011). Furthermore, since 2006 it is committed to provide an annual report on the risk 
assessment of nanotechnologies in food and feed (e.g. European Food Safety Authority, 
2015). It must be remembered that, in the current regulatory arrangement, food safety risk 
assessment is performed by the EFSA. Where nanomaterials are at stake, according to the 
EFSA, the general risk assessment methods do apply, but 'the assessment on a case by case 
basis is performed if no "common risks" are identified', something that is not easily 
determined (Marrani, 2013: 180). 
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The European Parliament and the Council are currently discussing a Commission proposal 
for new regulation on novel food and novel food ingredients, which should replace 
Regulation (EC) No. 258/97 by also covering nanomaterials. 
The process of consolidation of the EU regulatory framework also considered other key 
fields where nanotechnologies are relatively widespread. At the beginning of 2012, another 
resolution of the Parliament on biocidal products (pesticides, insect repellents, disinfectants, 
spermicides and substances which can be also used in food contact materials) also 
considering nanomaterials (European Parliament, 2012), triggered a revision process in this 
matter by requiring nano-specific mandatory labelling (art. 58.3(d)). This new intervention 
of the Parliament led the gradual replacement of the entire legislation on the question of 
biocidal products in 2012 (European Union, 2012a; 2014). The new regulation rests on the 
principle that '[t]reated articles should not be placed on the EU market unless all active 
substances contained in the biocidal products with which they were treated or which they 
incorporate are approved' for this use (second whereas). Then, with regard to the 
authorisation for the commercialization of a biocidal product 'where nanomaterials are used 
in that product, the risk for human health, animal health and the environment has to be 
assessed separately' (art. 19.1 (f)). In this regard, a simplified authorisation procedure is 
required, unless the biocidal product contains nanomaterials (art. 25 (c)). Also in the case of 
biocides, specific mandatory labelling, in the case of nanomaterials, is also required 
according to the specific request of the Parliament. In this case the label must indicate 'the 
name of all nanomaterials contained in the biocidal products followed by the word "nano" in 
brackets' (art. 58). Furthermore, member States must monitor the biocidal products and the 
treated articles, which have been placed on the market by constituting special 
documentation including the information on the use of nanomaterials and their potential 
risks (art. 65.2 (d)). 
In the meantime the Commission went back to deal with electronic devices with a 2012 
directive on waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) (European Union, 2012b) 
which stipulates the principle according to which all waste needs to return to the 
distributors to be collected and treated. In this instance the directive asked the Commission 
for assessing whether a 'specific treatment may be necessary' (eighteenth whereas) for waste 
containing nanomaterials due to health concerns (art. 8.4). 
The attention drawn by the EGE on nanomedicine in 2006, triggered a process of adaptation 
of the current EU regulation. In 2012 the European Commission delivered a proposal for 
regulation on medical devices, which stipulates the adoption of special care 'when [medical] 
devices contain or consist of nanomaterials that can be realised into the patient's or user's 
body' (European Commission, 2012b: art. 3). Special labelling indicating 'where devices 
contain or consist of nanomaterials' should be provided, unless they are encapsulated or 
bound in a manner that they cannot be released into the patient's or user's body (art. 19.2 
(f)). In this case they are addressed by a specific classification (class III), becoming subject to 
the most severe conformity assessment procedure, together with more invasive devices, 
devices in direct contact with the heart, implantable devices, breast implants, spinal disc 
replacement implants and so on (Rule 19). In this regard we can note a higher (and less 
coherent) attention threshold compared with the field of nanofood, which has greater 
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diffusion compared to the (low) degree of information available. Several medicines based on 
nanotechnology have already been approved by the European Medicines Agency 
(EMA) [17] and were subsequently commercialized within the EU market (e.g. Caelex 
containing doxorubicin, Mepact containing mifamurtide, Myocet containing doxorubicin, 
Abraxane containing paclitaxel, Emend containing aprepitant, Rapamune containing 
sirolimus) [18] . 
No consideration, on the other hand, has been shown regarding the growing sector of health 
self-monitoring systems, which many private companies are developing nowadays. For 
example, large companies are researching systems of self-screening which use nanoparticles 
(e.g. tiny iron-oxide particles) in the human body that can be monitored through a wearable 
device such as a watch (Barr and Wilson, 2014). This search raises concerns not only with 
regard to health, the use of personal data (which can be easily hacked), but mainly with 
regard to the patient/physician relation (which can be completely bypassed when a device 
is freely sold without medical consultation). This aspect was also neglected by EGE's 
opinion on nanomedicine, but today it acquires significant relevance due to the fast 
development of the market. 
6. FROM THE SECOND REGULATORY REVIEW TO 
HORIZON 2020: TOWARDS THE FUTURE REVISION 
OF REACH? 
After the first regulatory review and the experiment of the Commission code of conduct, at 
the end of 2012 the Commission concluded the second regulatory review on nanomaterials 
(European Commission, 2012c). It followed a report, the Commission Working Staff Paper 
(European Commission, 2012a), detailing essential information on definition of 
nanomaterial, the nanomaterial market, the uses, benefits, health and safety aspects, risk 
assessment, and information and databases on nanomaterials. 
At this time the broad sector of chemicals, where nanotechnologies are widely used, was 
also addressed for amendment. With the revision of REACH [19] the process of 
consolidation of the EU regulatory framework was almost concluded, with the slow and 
final transformation of a new governance pattern into a more traditional one made up of a 
set of sectorial and articulated legislations. 
As pointed out by the Parliament in 2009 there were doubts on the suitability of REACH's 
simplified registration for nanomaterials manufactured or imported below one tonne, on 
whether they can be deemed as new substances that require the need for a chemical safety 
report with exposure assessment for all registered nanomaterials, as well as the need to set 
out notification requirements for all nanomaterials placed on the market on their own, in 
preparations or in articles (European Parliament, 2009: 7). As recognised by the Commission: 
'[m]any registrations for substances known to have nanomaterial forms do not mention 
clearly which forms are covered or how information relates to the nanoform. Only little 
information is specifically addressing safe use of the specific nanomaterials supposed to be 
covered by the registration dossiers' (European Commission, 2012c: 6). In this regard the 
Commission promoted a Commission Working Staff Paper (European Commission, 2012a) 
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inquiring into aspects connected to the definition, the use and the diffusion of nanomaterials 
into the market, and two reports, RIPoN 2 (Hankin et al., 2011) and RIPon 3 (Aitken et al., 
2011), dealing with fulfilling information requirements and exposure assessment and 
risk/hazards characterisation for nanomaterials under REACH. These two reports should 
have been followed by specific consultation processes involving members of the REACH 
Competent Authorities Sub-Group on Nanomaterials (CASG-Nano) and the relevant experts 
from Member States, industry and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) nominated by 
REACH and Classification, Labelling & Packaging (CLP) Competent Authorities 
(CARACAL), meaning that new governance patterns are still considered strategic in this 
process of consolidation. 
During 2013 it promoted a consultation among all interested parties (in particular 
enterprises) on the modification of the REACH annex on nanomaterials [20] , which was to 
be accompanied by an impact assessment. In this sense the process of revision of REACH 
appears to be articulated according to a stage gate architecture [21] (Cooper 1990), which is a 
typical tool of the Responsible Research and Innovation model (Stilgoe et al. 2013: 1573; 
Owen 2014: 13) used to assess the adequacy of the proposal for revision thanks to inputs 
stemming from stakeholders. In this regard there is a more structured architecture of the 
process of law-making compared to that provided for the EC CoC in 2007 and after. For 
example, to ensure the transparency of participants' interest in the consultation a public 
register was created. Furthermore, the Commission encouraged the European Chemicals 
Agency (ECHA) to develop new guidance for registration since 'REACH sets the best 
possible framework for the risk management of nanomaterials' although 'more specific 
requirements for nanomaterials within the framework have proven necessary'. This 
conclusion was reached on the basis of the conviction that 'nanomaterials are similar to 
normal chemicals/substances in that some may be toxic and some may not', and there are 
'[p]ossible risks […] related to specific nanomaterials and specific uses'. In this regard the 
Commission is still persuaded that 'nanomaterials require a risk assessment, which should 
be performed on a case-by-case basis, using pertinent information' (European Commission, 
2012c: 11). In the Commission's view current risk assessment methods are thus still 
applicable. 
The monitoring activity of the Commission triggered by the 2009 resolution also invested 
other key fields some years later. As regards health at work when nanomaterials are 
involved, the Advisory Committee on Safety and Health at Work started working on a draft 
opinion on risk assessment and management of nanomaterials in the workplace, to be 
subsequently endorsed by the Advisory Committee. Similarly to that provided by the EFSA, 
guidance has also been provided by the Scientific Committee on Consumer Safety for 
cosmetic products (Scientific Committee on Consumer Safety, 2012). 
At the end of 2013 the Union launched the Horizon 2020 Framework Programme where 
nanotechnologies research and innovation represent one of the key areas of development 
within the EU 2020 strategy (European Union, 2013). The expressed priority is to fill the gap 
between knowledge and the market since without excellent research there can be neither 
progress nor development in the European economy (Berger, 2013). In order to boost both 
economic growth and occupational development, the EU proposed €80 billion for the period 
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2014-2020, by harnessing research and innovation at this aim. This budget included about 
€24,6 billion for science, €17,9 billion for industrial innovation and €31,75 billion 'targeted at 
the most pressing issues facing Europe such as climate change, sustainable transport, 
renewable energy and the medical care requirements of an ageing population' (European 
Commission, 2013: 40). 
It is worth noting that with this EU act, Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) (von 
Schomeberg, 2011; 2103; Owen et al., 2012; Owen et al., 2013; Owen, 2014) has been officially 
endorsed at the EU level (Ruggiu 2015: 217). As anticipated, it subsumes the safe, integrated 
and responsible approach under the RRI framework, which has been defined as 
'a transparent, interactive process by which societal actors and innovators become mutually 
responsive to each other with a view to the (ethical) acceptability, sustainability and societal 
desirability of the innovation process and its marketable products (in order to allow a proper 
embedding of scientific and technological advances in our society)' (von Schomberg, 2011: 
54). RRI should thus be considered as the subsequent step of the previous EU approach 
launched in the 2000s with the aim of re-modulating the whole EU regulatory framework. 
For this purpose Horizon 2020 has also built a strong ethical framework as the basis for both 
research and innovation, as well as paths for integrating 'society in science and innovation 
issues, policies, and activities in order to integrate citizens' interest and values' (European 
Union, 2013: 167). Accordingly, research and innovation have to respect the 'fundamental 
ethical principles', the EGE's opinions and take into account the objectives of reducing 
animal testing and 'ensuring a high level of human health protection in accordance with 
Article 168 TFEU' (European Union, 2013: 107). 'Particular attention shall be paid to the 
principle of proportionality, the right to privacy, the right to the protection of personal data, 
the right to the physical and mental integrity of a person, the right to non-discrimination 
and the need to ensure high levels of human health protection'. (European Union, 2013: art. 
19). In particular, stem cell research, both adult and embryonic, is 'subject to stringent ethical 
review' and '[n]o project involving the use of human embryonic stem cells research should 
be funded that does not obtain the necessary approval by Member States' (European Union, 
2013: 107). 
In sum, with Horizon 2020 a large part of the proactive dimension of the EU model tends to 
rest on the work of this ethical framework in the process of the allocation of EU funds. 
An overview of the arising EU regulatory framework shows a considerable effort in coping 
with the challenge thrown down by nanotechnologies. There is no doubt that the EU 
authorities have created the most regulated landscape at the global level. This is probably 
the most articulated and complex system of rules, one which is growing in this field. Yet we 
have to abstain from drawing any conclusion from this fact and analyse it further. 
The current European model of governance is dominated by the case-by-case approach, 
which has ensured the necessary flexibility to cope with the challenges of the fast 
development of science and innovation, but it also has given us an unstable system exposed 
to sudden and unforeseen changes, with a high risk of inconsistency and incoherence. It 
arose as a safe, integrated and responsible approach under the initial agreement of the 
Commission and the European Parliament by privileging 'new' forms of governance 
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characterized by the absence of a mandatory nature such as communications (2004 and 2007 
Commission communications and Action plan 2005-2009), resolutions (2006 and 2009 
Parliament resolutions), and recommendations (2008 Commission recommendation). In this 
framework the 2008 EC CoC, realized in part thanks to a stakeholder consultation, launched 
with a Commission communication in 2007, was the summit of this trend inspired by the 
new governance turn, as well as the first application of the RRI pattern within the EU. In this 
case we have observed the simultaneous use of EU goals and forms of stakeholder 
engagement (such as consultations) for building a framework of shared responsibility and 
triggering self-regulatory behaviors. In this framework the EU resorted to old and new tools 
such as agency and comitology by involving EMA (2006), EFSA (2011), EGE (2007) in order 
to consolidate this climate of positive cooperation in the field of nanotechnologies. In the 
meantime this ambitious attempt at experimenting new forms of governance founded on the 
existing regulation on chemicals, novel food, cosmetics, drugs and medical devices, which 
showed itself to be largely insufficient vis à vis the challenges of nanotechnologies. Thus, 
while the progressive data collection on the risks of nanotechnologies became public (e.g. 
Shvedova et al., 2005; Poland et al., 2008; Mwilu et al., 2013; Zhang et al., 2007; Song et al., 
2008; Journeay and Goldman, 2014), the insufficiency of the existing regulation became 
apparent and the climate of collaboration that had initially characterized the work of EU 
institutions abruptly changed. In this sense the EU approach did not appear to be adequate 
for the complexity of a field where risks, unknown consequences and opportunities are 
inextricably intertwined (Ruggiu, 2013b), in particular as regards the protection of 
individual rights such as consumer rights (information, not only in cosmetics and food), the 
right to health (REACH, safety at the workplace, novel food), and the right to a healthy 
environment (nanoelectronics, the recycling of electronic equipment and electric waste). 
Thus, with the 2009 Parliament resolution the EU governance arrangement profoundly 
changed by shifting from an adaptive, flexible and slightly inclusive model to a hybrid one, 
which mixes traditional with new modes of governance and even forms a self-governance 
arrangement. In the actual governance framework we can notice increasing recourse to 
traditional forms of hard legislation (new regulation on cosmetics 2009, new regulation on 
food labelling 2011, new regulation on biocides 2012, the plan to revise the legislation on 
chemicals) together with classical tools of new governance such as consultations and 
communications (e.g. second regulatory review 2012), meaning that the final stage of this 
process is the sectorial legislation. In this framework there is still room for the 
experimentation of tools typical of the Responsible Research and Innovation model such as 
consultations launched for the revision of REACH (2013). Accordingly, despite the use of 
hard legislation, room for positive interactions with stakeholders of a spontaneous nature 
(self-governance) are also opened up (2011 Colipa guidelines). Yet in this framework new 
governance tools seem to have a merely provisional nature, working as a lung in order to 
prepare the growth of traditional regulation of a hard law nature (REACH, safety at the 
workplace). In this sense new governance tools seem to be destined to progressively 
disappear, to be substituted by sectoral legislation on nanotechnologies. 
Some shortcomings appear evident here, and they are analysed below: 
1. First of all, what emerges in this approach is the difficulty in maintaining the 
consistency of the regulatory choices within the framework of EU policy on 
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nanotechnologies. In its initial stage the safe, integrated and responsible approach 
seemed to foster the self-regulatory capacity of the market in order to boost the entire 
sector of nanotechnologies and make the EU economy one of the most competitive in 
the world. Then, under the impulse of the Parliament it abruptly changed direction 
and started to regulate several sectors in detail (e.g. cosmetics, food labelling, 
biocides and so on). The direction of this consolidation process is clear. The wide-
ranging activity of the EU agencies and committees is also leading towards a rather 
slow consolidation process of the regulation on nanotechnologies, in particular as 
regards chemicals. In this regard, this arrangement is neither a case of the new 
governance method, nor of a classic governance method traditionally pursued by the 
European Union through regulations and directives, nor does it appear to be stable. 
2. This governance arrangement seems to lack homogeneity due to its case-by-case 
nature. Measures seem to grow without an overall vision and there is the lack of 
coherence. There is increasing attention to some sectors, such as electronics, 
nanomedicine, cosmetics, biocides with regard to information, labelling and risk-
assessment, but there appears to be less focus on other sectors, in which human 
exposure [22] is high (e.g. food and feed, safety at the workplace, chemicals), thus 
running the risk of endangering some individual rights (information, health, the 
environment). In some sectors, which are strategic for the economies of European 
countries, attention may even appear to be excessive (e.g. nanoelectronics, 
nanomedicine), representing a restraint for growth. In this regard, the ethics 
framework provided by research funding framework programmes does seem to 
affect policy choices in an incoherent manner at the EU level. 
3. Some measures have been slow to appear, such as those on the definition of 
nanomaterial (2011), or those on labelling in cosmetics and food (2009, 2011), which 
could have been adopted much earlier, or the re-modulation of the legislation on 
chemicals (2012) and that on safety at the workplace (2009), which was already 
foreseeable in the 2000s. Finally, although the EU recognized that nanomaterials are 
all different, thus making general regulation problematic, no specific measure has 
been adopted until now, despite the fact that potential uses are emerging from 
scientific research and this cannot but imply unnecessary risks for individual rights. 
For example, although toxicological studies on carbon nanotubes have been known 
in the scientific community since 2005, no measure has been taken into account on 
their use at the workplace, even in order to address or foster good practices. But a 
similar argument could be made with regard to other materials (e.g. silver 
nanoparticles). The anticipatory dimension of the current model is thus somewhat 
questionable, particularly as regards human rights. Indeed we could ask whether the 
adoption of some upstream criteria at the earliest stage could have led to a more 
coherent, homogeneous and timely approach to nanotechnologies. The resources of 
human rights could have played a more proactive role within EU policies, by 
creating coherence for the whole system and thus avoiding sudden changes in 
regulatory direction (Ruggiu, 2013a; 2013c; 2015). 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
The regulatory framework, which is emerging at the EU level, is actually a hybrid using new 
governance tools as a bellows in preparation for the adoption of instruments of a sectoral 
nature. According to a case-by-case approach this model has shifted from an initial 
preference for soft forms of governance based upon a view that the existing regulatory 
framework was adequate, to a model of governance, which is slowly replacing its sectoral 
legislation with new forms of legislation. Following this slow process of consolidation I 
argue that this model lacks consistency since it is exposed to abrupt changes of direction. It 
lacks homogeneity since it pays excessive attention to some key sectors (nanoelectronics, 
nanomedicine) negatively affecting European growth, while other sectors are given little 
attention (novel food, chemicals, workplace), thus opening up to possible and further future 
shifts. It lacks the needed coherence since it risks shifting from an underestimation of the 
cases where nanotechnologies imply risks to humans, to an irrational over-evaluation of 
existing risks accompanying undeniable benefits (e.g. nanomedicine) [23] . In other words, 
this model, so exposed to evaluations according to a case-by-case rationale, has a weak 
anticipatory dimension, which leads it to face risks just and when they appear depending 
only on the incremental process of scientific knowledge. Thus the model seems to respond to 
them with belated solutions. Conversely, the implementation of some upstream criteria such 
as human rights would allow specific instances that need more attention as regards 
individual rights to be addressed in a timely fashion (and which could be considered as 
possible future legal cases), thus avoiding belated and expensive measures, which takes the 
form of tools of a hard law nature [24] . Human rights, instead, can also provide solutions of 
a soft law nature by fostering forms of Corporate Social Responsibility focused on specific 
situations (individual health, information, the environmental protection etc.), by treating use 
of traditional legislative measure as exceptional (Pariotti and Ruggiu, 2012). This would 
allow the system to develop solutions inspired by the new governance framework. It would 
create coherence and relative stability on the basis of a set of upstream rights that can be 
found today in most European societies, and would also ensure flexibility in dealing with 
the challenges of emerging technologies (Ruggiu, 2012; 2013a; 2013c; 2015). 
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